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Union Networks and Global 
 Unionism in Maritime Shipping
NATHAN LILLIE
Under the auspices of the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation’s (ITF) Flag of Convenience campaign, maritime 
unions have developed transnational global structures exploiting 
interdependencies in transportation production chains. The ITF, 
a London-based association of transport unions, connects the 
struggles of seafarers and port workers through a global strategy 
of union networking and coordinated industrial action. Seafaring 
unions draw on the industrial leverage of port workers to negotiate 
minimum standard pay agreements, while dock unions leverage the 
growing influence of the ITF in fighting union busting in ports. A 
global transnational ship inspector network provides the power 
basis for imposing collective agreements on shipowners. Although 
conceived as a resource for organizing seafarers, the inspectorate 
also provides port unions with leverage.
One of the central questions in industrial relations is whether unions can 
regain their influence in the face of capital’s increasingly fluid transnational 
production strategies in the current era of globalization. Maritime  shipping 
is arguably the most globalized of all industries, and also the industry 
with the most significant transnational union strategy coordination. Under 
the auspices of the International Transport Workers’ Federation’s (ITF) 
Flag of Convenience (FOC) campaign, maritime unions have developed 
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 trans national global structures1 which exploit interdependencies in trans-
portation production chains by leveraging union strength in one part of the 
chain, ports, to further the interest workers in another part of the chain, on 
board ships at sea. The example highlights the potential for a union strategy 
of identifying and exploiting the linkages and interdependencies inherent 
in transnational production processes by building transnational networks 
and institutions suited to the particular logic of production in an industry. 
It also highlights the power-resource building nature of seemingly altruistic 
solidarity, and the ways in which solidarity can be reframed to counter new 
transnational capitalist strategies of worker alienation as these develop.
Maritime cargo transport on ships and cargo handling in ports are 
interdependent aspects of the same production process. Seafarers work 
on seagoing ships, which, due to the FOC system of ship registration and 
transnational recruitment, are to a large extent disembedded from any 
 unified national regulatory or social context. National seafaring unions in 
the developed world have been in decline since the 1950s due to the growth 
of FOCs. In contrast, dock workers are generally thoroughly embedded 
in local social and political contexts, and have a high degree of industrial 
leverage because of their position in the production process. However, 
the increasing vertical concentration of maritime capital has fuelled an 
impetus to implement greater managerial control over all links in the 
transport production chain, including ports. The assault on dock workers’ 
working conditions has manifested itself somewhat differently than that 
on seafarers—instead of shifting labour sources to circumvent nationally 
based labour organization, employers have attacked labour organizations 
and mobilizing capacities directly. The ITF, a London-based Global Union 
Federation (GUF) of transport unions connects the struggles of seafarers 
and port workers through a global strategy of union networking and coor-
dinated industrial action. Seafaring unions draw on the industrial leverage 
of port workers to negotiate minimum standard pay agreements, while dock 
unions leverage the growing influence of the ITF in their efforts to thwart 
union busting in ports. 
This article will begin with a discussion of how globalization processes 
are strategically exploited by capital as a means of alienating workers 
from their product, and show how class conflict is shaped by this within 
the transport industry. It will then show how the different manifestations 
of globalization in different maritime industry segments have produced 
different challenges for transnational union structures. ITF structures and 
1. The ITF Flag of Convenience campaign originally aimed at the political abolition of the 
FOC system. As the industrial campaign has gained momentum, this political goal has 
faded.
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the development of a transnational union network of ship inspectors will 
be described. Finally, the ways in which seafaring unions and dock unions 
use these ITF structures to regain control of labour markets and work 
 processes will be analyzed. To conclude, broader lessons from the case 
will be presented.
GLOBALIZATION AS AN EMPLOYER STRATEGY OF 
 ALIENATION
Globalization restructures industrial processes, and thereby creates 
new and differently formed political spaces of contestation (Amoore, 
2002). These new spaces, at least initially, are less amenable to worker 
resistance—if nothing else because one motivating factor in capital’s 
restructuring along transnational lines is to reduce the capacity of workers 
to resist. As Wennerlind (2002) shows in his analysis of alienation,  capital 
strategically adopts social and technological innovations to protect its 
 ability to extract surplus value. A variety of devices, including restructur-
ing manufacturing processes (Braverman, 1974), new technology (Marglin, 
1974), and so on are deployed to regulate the level and means of alienation 
of workers from their product, depending on the circumstances, and the 
specific manifestations of worker resistance. Geographical strategies, such 
as moving investment, or dividing production chains spatially to optimize 
the characteristics of workforces involved in specific production tasks 
(Herod, 1992), can also be regarded as components of capital’s repertoire 
of alienation strategies. 
Nationally organized labour unions evolved to suit the geography of 
production and the political economy of the international nation state system 
(Cox, 1987). Globalization is, in part, a capitalist strategy specifically designed 
to reduce labour’s capacity for resistance by undermining and circumventing 
this national basis of organization. The outcome has been the fragmentation 
of national industrial relations systems, bargaining structures, and trade union 
organizations. For example, because of the transnationalization of manage-
ment industrial relations strategy, national sectoral bargaining is now more 
driven by company level developments than vice-versa (Marginson, Sisson 
and Arrowsmith, 2003). Transnational industrial relations systems based in 
and around firms displace national systems, undermining their cohesion (Katz 
and Darbishire, 1999). As Tuckman and Whittall show, this process can dis-
advantage local union officials who, no longer supported to the same extent 
by national union organizations, become caught up in a management driven 
process of  productivist and  concessionary bargaining (Tuckman and Whittall, 
2002). The shift to a global stage ensures that current union structures are 
unsuited to effectively organizing and channelling worker resistance. 
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While union structures are not static, substantial barriers exist to union 
restructuring along transnational lines (Ramsay, 1997), so that current 
 configurations structure the process of change in ways not necessarily suited 
to building industrial strength through solidarity (Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 
2004). Translation of capital’s new vulnerabilities into actual leverage for 
worker representation requires the restructuring of union organizations 
and the adoption of new strategies along lines dictated by the new logic of 
production. The specific nature of these structures and strategies therefore 
depends on the logic of production and the opportunities for contestation 
within each industry (Anner et al., forthcoming, 2006).
The specific ways in which transport has restructured along global 
lines, in part driving and in part driven by the globalization of production 
in other sectors, therefore impact the strategies of transport workers and 
unions. Cargo transport is a key sector for organized labour because it links 
other sectors. Militant labour organizations in transport allow the strategic 
exertion of leverage in dependant and connected processes (James and 
James, 1963). Transport workers, and especially dock workers, often find 
themselves in a position to undertake direct solidarity actions in support 
of other workers, and not infrequently, they actually do so. In particular, 
dock workers are well known for their ability to organize effective shop 
floor action (Turnbull, Morris and Sapsford, 1996), although other transport 
sectors have above-average levels of industrial militancy as well (Silver, 
2003: 97–102).
Maritime capital works at various levels to undermine, circumvent, or 
outright challenge the control of transport workers over their production 
processes, and to limit their capacity to act in solidarity with other workers. 
The movement of ships to FOC registers, and increasing direct attacks on 
port unions can be seen as aspects of capital’s counter strategy. Geographic 
movements and organizational restructuring to undermine labour’s capacity 
to resist are long established strategies (Cowie, 1999), and not inherently 
connected to the current phase of globalization. However, globalization 
extends the contest to a wider stage, providing both capital and organized 
labour with new sets of opportunities and constraints, as well as new orga-
nizational imperatives in terms of structure and strategy.
METHODS
This case study is based primarily on a total of more than 90 inter-
views and conversations with union officials and employer representatives 
in Australia, North America, and Europe, conducted between 1998 and 
2004. For easy reference, press reports and secondary sources are cited 
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wherever possible. The sections detailing the processes of globalization and 
 restructuring in shipping and ports are based on industry press accounts and 
secondary analysis, supplemented by interviews with dock and seafaring 
union officials, industry association representatives from shipowner associa-
tions, and seafarer mission (church) employees. The section on ITF structure 
is based on ITF reports on activities, the ITF website (www.itf.org.uk), 
discussions with ITF staff, seafaring union officials, dock union  officials, 
and personal observation of their interactions at International Labour 
Organization negotiations in July 2003, January 2004, and September 
2004. On the ITF inspectorate, the case relies on ITF documentation and 
secondary sources for the early development of the inspectorate (until the 
1980s), and thereafter, on 10 semi-structured interviews with ITF inspec-
tors in the Australia, Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the USA. These are 
supplemented by discussions with three seafarer mission staff in New York 
City and Seattle (who sometimes work closely with inspectors),  several 
ITF Secretariat staff involved in providing support for the inspectors, and 
dock union officials in Finland, Germany, Sweden, and the USA, who are 
involved in mobilizing dock union support. 
The section on IBF bargaining relies mainly on discussions with 
senior seafaring and dock union officials, and shipowner association 
representatives involved in the bargaining process. The section on dock 
union responses to restructuring relies on five interviews with dock union 
officials in Finland, Germany, Sweden and the USA between 1998 and 
2001, discussions with ITF dockers’ section staff in 2001, and research into 
the European Port Services Directive at the European Parliament in 2004. 
This is supplemented with ITF documents and press reports, particularly 
as regards developments before the 1990s.
GLOBAL LABOUR MARKETS AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF 
NATIONAL SEAFARING UNION STRUCTURE
Owners of ships in international trade have been able to disembed 
production relations on their ships through the Flag of Convenience (FOC) 
institution. Immediately after World War Two, shipping was regulated 
nationally, similar to the situation in other sectors. This gradually changed 
as ship owners, fleeing taxes and strong unions, began to move away 
from traditional flags to flags which are neither capable of nor particularly 
 interested in regulating the ships they register (Northup and Rowan, 1983). 
FOC countries offer their flag for the tonnage tax and registration fees it 
brings. Effectively, they sell their inability to regulate to shipowners for a 
nominal fee (Alderton and Winchester, 2002: 40). 
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Moving to FOCs brought freedom to hire from anywhere. As a result, 
maritime labour sourcing shifted geographically, in favour of countries 
with lower cost labour. Just after World War II, FOC crews were drawn 
from diverse countries including northern Europe. By the 1970s, northern 
Europeans had become too expensive, and sourcing shifted to southern 
Europe, Korea, and Africa. Through the 1970s and 80s, Filipinos began 
to displace other groups, in part as a result of the Filipino government’s 
policy of encouraging the export of cheap labour for foreign exchange 
(CIIR, 1987). With the opening of the eastern Bloc, Russia and other post-
communist challenged the primacy of the Philippines and India (which 
has always been a major seafaring labour supplier) by flooding the market 
with highly trained seafarers (Johnsson, 1996). Currently, new entrants 
such as China and Indonesia threaten the wage norms Filipino seafarers 
have come to expect. 
The move to global labour sourcing also reduces the capacity of seafarers 
to organize and resist. The global institutional infrastructure which has devel-
oped to hire ship crews from low-wage seafaring labour supply countries 
for work anywhere in the world (Alderton et al., 2004: 31–48), has a strong 
coercive aspect—as ship crews can be quickly replaced. Multi-national ship 
crews, which are now the norm (Alderton et al., 2004), create social and 
cultural divisions among seafarers (Sampson, 2003). Where unions represent 
FOC crew, quite often there are different unions representing crew from dif-
ferent countries, not to mention different crafts. Furthermore, deregulation 
of the work environment makes possible  serious violations of human rights 
by unscrupulous employers. FOC countries often have neither the ability nor 
the will to enforce their legal systems on the vessels they flag (Chapman, 
1992), and most seafarers do not have means to pursue legal claims in courts 
in far away FOC countries they have probably never visited. 
The globalization of labour sourcing, and the disconnection of shipping 
from legal spaces to which unions have regularized institutional access, 
dictate the structure of the new transnational union networks. Structures 
for industrial action must extend to those areas where industrial leverage is 
high, and these should be combined with and connected to representational 
structures which are effective in the places where seafarers work. Ideally, 
these structures should also be present in the places where they live when 
they are between jobs and when they are being trained and recruited. Union 
representatives must be able to act locally in the rapid time scales prevalent 
in the shipping industry—there is little point in union representation which 
is unable to get to a ship which may only be in port several hours2—and 
2. Sampson and Wu (2003), for example, describe the way in which the organization of 
modern port work has speeded up the turnaround time for ships, decreasing the opportuni-
ties for seafarers to go ashore.
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local action must be consistent with and embedded in a global strategy. As 
a result of the need for new transnational structures and forms of action, 
nationally based seafaring unions have been sidelined by the transnational 
network based around the ITF. 
PORTS RESTRUCTURING AND GLOBALIZATION
Capital in ports is in a very different situation, being to a large extent 
fixed and within the territories of nation states. Ports cannot shift them-
selves away from national labour regulation, unions and shore-based 
 communities so easily. Rather, port based capital has been obliged to fight 
it out in spaces where labour is capable of mounting effective resistance. 
Despite the  difficulties, the concentration of capital in fewer and larger 
global firms, often vertically integrated into multiple transportation chain 
links, has  provided both the motive and opportunity to reduce the influ-
ence of port unions. Before the 1980s, the structure of relations between 
ports, shipping lines, and shippers interfered with initiatives to break dock 
unions and change the highly unionized labour relations systems in ports. 
Port unions could rely on divisions between the interests of relatively 
smaller and fragmented shipping lines, shippers, stevedoring companies and 
governments to pressure ports to come to a quick settlement. Fragmented 
shipping interests found it too difficult and expensive for port workers to 
remain on strike, and too easy to settle and pass the increased labour costs 
on to port customers. 
Changes in the structure of the shipping industry over the past two 
decades mean the larger transnational shipping companies of today 
have a vested interest in shifting the balance of power in ports, because 
 passing on the costs has become more difficult. Some giant shipping liner 
firms such as P&O Nedlloyd have transformed into vertically integrated 
logistics companies, through the acquisition of cargo handling facilities. 
Alternately, cargo handling firms such as the Seattle-based Stevedoring 
Services of America (SSA) or the Singaporean PSA have expanded globally 
but horizontally, remaining specialized in the operation of port facilities 
(Containerisation International, March 1999: 99–101). Furthermore, the 
new emphasis on logistics, including “door-to-door” delivery in some firms, 
has created an imperative for greater managerial control in all production 
nodes (Robinson, 2002), and a lower tolerance for the effects of industrial 
action in ports. For labour, the news is not all bad, however. To the extent 
that labour can act transnationally, the new globally integrated companies 
are in some ways more vulnerable than they were in the past, because any 
local dispute can quickly become a liability to tightly integrated operations 
around the globe.
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The rapid and total workforce replacement by presumably compliant 
workers from developing countries seen on many FOC ships has not been 
possible in ports. Instead, maritime capital has had to take advantage of 
the resources available in each particular national and local context to 
challenge dock union power. For example in Santos, Brazil, the port users 
and the port authority, Cosdep, have long wanted to reduce the size of the 
workforce, and introduce new work rules (Containerisation International, 
June 1995: 95–97). In 2001, a combination of competition from smaller 
newly expanded Brazilian container ports, self-loading by some liner com-
panies, and a greater collective spirit among port employers and port users 
enabled the port to take on the unions and win a two-week strike (Lloyd’s 
List, 5 April 2001). Similar stories can be told about New Zealand (Green, 
1996) and the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong (Lloyd’s List, 19 March 
1997; 10 July 2001), where Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) helped 
provide the backing needed to take on the power of the dock unions. SSA 
is also thought to be the most influential actor within the Pacific Maritime 
Association (PMA), behind the 2002 drive to break the coast-wide contract 
with the union on the US West Coast (Pacific Business Journal, 18 Sept. 
2002). In Marseilles, port employers endured long strikes to win conces-
sions, with the explicit backing of the port users’ association (Lloyd’s List, 
18 July 1994). In the Indian ports of Mumbai and Chennai as well as in 
Colombo in Sri Lanka, P&O Ports took on local unions to push through 
unpopular (with the workers) privatization plans (Lloyd’s List, 2 July 2002; 
29 Feb. 1997). Global maritime capital is now more ready to get behind 
port employers who take on dock unions creating ‘local’ problems for them. 
Dock unions, however, have responded by building up their international 
linkages. Although dock unions’ international linkages have an existence 
and logic of their own, this article argues that they are also closely linked 
to FOC campaign strategy. Production process linkages and increasingly 
common threats from common employers make construction of solidarity 
along the links in the production chain an important strategy.
THE ITF
As has been shown, maritime unions, both on ships and in ports, 
have come under attack, and successful resistance has required globally 
coordinated union action. Because of this, the role of the ITF, as a coor-
dinator and mediator between national unions, as a distributor of strategic 
information, as a center of a global union network, and as a union actor 
in its own right, has increased over time. Much of the ITF’s coordinating 
apparatus is concentrated in the ITF Secretariat in London where profes-
sional staffers oversee the implementation of FOC campaign policy, and 
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in the Fair Practices Committee (FPC) meetings where ITF and national 
union officials determine FOC campaign policy. The ITF’s presence on the 
ground is ensured by the FOC campaign’s own power resource—the ITF 
ship inspector network. The network provides the power basis for impos-
ing collective negotiations on shipowners. Although conceived as an FOC 
campaign resource, the inspectorate directly, as well as indirectly through 
ITF influence with shipowners, also provides port unions with leverage. 
The ITF’s power has increased over time, and it has become an 
influential body not only vis-à-vis employers, but also vis-à-vis national 
unions. However, it is important to note that ITF influence depends on its 
constitutive unions. Rather than conceiving of the ITF as an independent 
global union body, it is more accurate to think of it as an organization for 
pooling union authority, and for coordinating national activity in systematic 
ways. Also, the ITF is responsible for a number of transport sectors besides 
maritime. In other sectors, although the role of the ITF has increased, it 
has not grown nearly to the same extent as in maritime. In civil aviation, 
for example, despite ITF promotion of the idea, unions have shied away 
from the inspector model of union transnationalization (Lillie and Martinez 
Lucio, 2004: 173).
ITF INSPECTORATE
The purpose of the ITF inspector network is to obtain and enforce col-
lective bargaining agreements (CBAs) on FOC ships. There are 105 ITF 
inspectors and coordinators,3 who monitor compliance with ITF contracts, 
coordinate industrial action against ships without contracts, and assist 
seafarers in distress. Though formally employed by their local or national 
unions, inspectors are in fact answerable to the Secretariat.4 When an FOC 
ship visits a port, it may receive a visit from an inspector. If the ship has 
an approved ITF CBA, the inspector will talk to the crew and check the 
payroll to ensure standards are being maintained. If it does not have a CBA, 
the inspector will attempt to obtain one, using persuasion and the threat 
of industrial action by port workers (Northup and Rowan, 1983; Northup 
3. According to the ITF ‘Message to Seafarers,’ directory examined in December 2004. 
4.  The extent to which this is true, however, seems to vary from place to place. In Sweden 
and Finland, where the maritime unions are influential within the ITF, and the inspectors 
are in any case very effective, there seems to be a high degree of national autonomy. In 
the USA, on the other hand, where corrupt inspectors from certain seafaring unions have 
caused problems in the past, and there is strong rivalry between maritime unions, the ITF 
exerts more direct control (Journal of Commerce, 23 Aug. 1987; Journal of Commerce, 
26 Dec. 1995).
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and Scrase, 1996). The ITF “Actions Unit” in London provides advice 
and support for industrial action, including information on ships and ship 
 owners, such as past movements, disputes with the ITF, and agreements 
signed (ITF FCR, various years). 
Today’s inspectorate is the result of a 30-year development process, 
during which it has changed to reflect the global and trans national structure 
of the industry. The inspectorate has developed along three distinct, though 
related dimensions. First, the inspectorate has expanded geographically, 
from its core in countries with very strong labour movements, to include 
most of Europe, North America, Japan, and more recently, many developing 
and formerly state socialist countries (ITF FCR, various years; ITF ROA, 
various years, Northup and Rowan, 1983; Northup and Scrase, 1996). 
Second, it has become more transnational, so that policies are uniform and 
centrally coordinated. Information about agreements, actions, and vessels 
is now instantly available to individual inspectors (Lee, 1997). Third, the 
inspectorate has become more professional, so that inspectors are skilled 
in mobilizing port workers, in negotiating with ship owners, and in imple-
menting uniform procedures. There is accountability to the ITF for job 
performance, measured, among other things, in terms of contracts obtained 
relative to the difficulty in obtaining contracts in that inspector’s port. 
When the FOC campaign began in 1948, it was conducted without any 
formal transnational structures. Throughout the 50s and 60s, unions agreed 
from time to time on global FOC boycott actions, none of which had perma-
nent impact (Northup and Rowan, 1983; Metaxas, 1985). In a 1971 meeting 
of the FPC, some unions asserted the campaign, as it had been conducted, 
had failed utterly. Only an insignificant number of FOC vessels operated 
under ITF contracts, and the FOC fleet continued to grow. ITF affiliates 
committed to appointing inspectors responsible for  enforcing the ITF 
 minimum wage level for seafarers on FOC vessels (Johnsson, 1996: 44–51;
Koch-Baumgarten, 1999: 448). With this renewal, unions in Australia, 
Finland, Israel, Sweden, and the United Kingdom began conducting boy-
cotts of FOC vessels regularly. Employers reported occasional boycotts and 
ship inspections in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain (Northup and Rowan, 1983: 
Appendix B). Throughout the 1970s, Australia, Finland, Sweden, and the 
UK formed the backbone of the campaign’s industrial strength (Northup 
and Rowan, 1983: Appendix B; Johnsson, 1996). 
FOC campaign structure during the 1970s, however, remained sub-
stantially national rather than transnational in character. Although ITF 
records indicate a large number of inspectors in various countries, it is not 
clear that all these inspectors really undertook  substantial FOC campaign 
work (ITF ROA, various years). Accounts of ITF boycotts and inspector 
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activities indicate inconsistency in what ITF affiliates and inspectors tried 
to accomplish. On the one hand, the number of vessels under ITF contract 
rose consistently throughout the period, both as an absolute number and as 
a percentage of the rapidly growing FOC fleet (Lillie, 2004: 53). On the 
other hand, not all FOC campaign actions had the objective of obtaining ITF 
contracts at consistent wage levels. On some occasions, ITF actions only 
backed up industrial action by the seafarers themselves, settling for what-
ever the seafarers were willing to accept (usually less than ITF rates).5 On 
occasion, boycott activity aimed at replacing the FOC crew with a national 
one of seafarers from the boycotting country (Harrigan, 1984). 
There was also a lack of follow up to ensure that ITF wages continued to 
be paid after the boycott was finished. Problems occurred in remitting back 
pay obtained through boycott action to seafarers. Once seafarers returned 
home, they were frequently blacklisted. Employers sometimes attempted 
to recover ITF pay through legal (or illegal) means, and there was no way 
to protect seafarers from this.6 An ITF inspector relates:
In the early 1980s, ship inspections started taking place [in the United States], 
but the inspections were not well managed, or coordinated. Everybody just 
did what they could, and didn’t understand the consequences. Action against 
ships did not always work out well for the seafarers because there was no way 
to follow up. It wasn’t organized.
Despite its geographical limitations and lack of coordination, the FOC 
industrial campaign grew in strength and effectiveness through the 1970s. 
By the 1980s, ship owners clearly considered the ITF a threat to their 
operations, even if not resigned to complying with ITF demands. In 1982, 
the International Shipping Federation (ISF), a global federation of national 
ship owner associations, began coordinating employer responses (Northup 
and Rowan, 1983; Johnsson, 1996). 
The ISF noted that most of the campaign’s leverage derived from 
secondary action in relatively few countries. The ISF attempted to weaken 
this leverage by challenging the legality of boycotts in test cases where the 
ITF was “set up” to take action on the borderline of legality. In the UK, in 
the early 1980s, changes introduced by Thatcher altered the industrial rela-
tions landscape to make secondary action unfeasible. In Australia, Finland 
and Sweden, however, ship owners’ efforts failed to change the situation, 
except briefly in Sweden in the early 1990s (Northup and Rowan, 1983; 
5. According to B.L. Williamson’s account this appears to have been the case in Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States (Northup and Rowan, 1983: 
Appendix B). 
6. Blacklisting and employer attempts to recover ITF wages after the fact continue to be a 
problem although there are now institutions and routines for dealing with this.
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Northup and Scrase, 1996). By the end of the 1980s, however, in terms of 
the number of ITF approved CBAs on FOC vessels, the FOC campaign 
looked to be in a state of serious decline (Lillie, 2004: 53). 
This decline, however, turned around during the 1990s, as a result of 
improvements in geographical coverage and coordination in the inspector 
network, which began in the early 80s, and continued in the 1990s. In 1983, 
the ITF appointed inspectors in Japan. In 1986, the ITF appointed several 
inspectors from US unions on the East Coast. With the affiliation of the 
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) in 1988, the inspec-
tor network expanded to the West Coast as well (Journal of Commerce, 
26 Dec. 95). Through the 1990s, the ITF also appointed new inspectors in 
previously underrepresented regions, including Poland, Russia, India, South 
Africa, and South America. Methods and communications also improved 
steadily beginning in the 1980s. Inspector training programs began in the 
1980s, initially using methods developed by Scandinavian inspectors. The 
ITF “flattened” and regionalized the structure, so that inspectors are in direct 
communication with each other on day-to-day matters. The ITF was the first 
GUF to make substantial use of the technological possibilities of the internet, 
email, and remotely accessible databases, giving inspectors round-the-clock 
access to records on individual ships and owners (Lee, 1997). 
The inspector network exists in continued tension between the need 
for global systems and procedures, and local requirements for flexibility. 
Every port has a different legal, industrial and political situation, meaning 
that each inspector faces a different set of opportunities and constraints 
on his or her ability to mobilize support. If ship inspections and boycotts 
are legally and institutionally supported, the inspector’s job is easier. In 
Finland, for example, an inspector can successfully rely on institutional 
channels for mobilizing boycotts, because permissive industrial legislation 
protects workers in their action. A Finnish dock union official states: “It 
[the FOC campaign] is not controversial, and the stevedoring companies 
have accepted the boycott practice. Finnish boycott actions are always 
successful.” On the other hand, if secondary industrial action is legally 
constrained, the inspector needs a more subtle approach. In the USA, an 
inspector cannot always legally order a boycott, and has to find other ways 
to pressure ship owners. One US inspector relates that, “in some countries, 
like Norway and Finland, they can stop a ship just because it has no labour 
agreement. We need more reason here; we have to look for discrepancies 
between conditions and existing employment contracts.” Although the ITF 
seeks to systematize procedures across space, there is a continued tension 
between local and global dynamics. Strategically, this is problematic in that 
uniformity is desired, but it is also sometimes useful because it allows for 
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‘venue shopping,’ or leveraging union strength in places where the ITF is 
strong to compensate for lack of leverage where the ITF is weak. 
The ITF inspector network is crucial to making the FOC industrial 
campaign work, by providing the infrastructure with which the ITF connects 
global strategy with local tactics. Prior to the growth of the inspectorate, 
transnational union cooperation in maritime was more similar to that in 
other industries where, whenever a transnational action of any substance 
is contemplated, unions generally start from a position of little knowledge 
about their counterparts in other countries. New contacts need to be made, 
repertoires devised, and conflicts of interest negotiated. The legal situation 
for secondary action may be unclear, and the unions will most likely have 
to conduct research, or just use trial and error, to discover a company’s 
vulnerabilities (Greven and Russo, 2003). The ITF resolves these issues 
by having inspectors who are simultaneously local union officials and 
global activists. ITF policies and methods can be decided collectively by 
the affiliates in London and implemented by the Secretariat through its own 
channels without revisiting political disagreements between affiliates each 
time a transnational action is contemplated.
SEAFARING UNIONS AND GLOBAL BARGAINING
For seafaring unions, the main purpose of the inspector network has 
been to obtain and to monitor ITF agreements on FOC ships. The  inspector 
network’s increasing effectiveness is evidenced in the steady growth in 
the number of ships under contract throughout the 1990s, as well as the 
increasing degree to which shipowners have felt the need to engage the ITF 
in global level bargaining. Between 1990 and 2000, the proportion of FOC 
ships with ITF agreements increased from less than 8% of the FOC fleet to 
more than 30% (Lillie, 2004: 53). 
Pressured by the ITF’s expanded presence, some shipowners began to 
see the benefits of a negotiated relationship with the ITF. Still, organizing 
to bargaining collectively has been a contentious issue among shipowner 
associations in the ISF. Many shipowner groups believe the ITF should not 
be given legitimacy as a bargaining partner. In the early 1990s, a group 
of shipping companies formed a separate association, the International 
Maritime Employers’ Committee (IMEC), to be able to design a more 
flexible bargaining strategy.7 While not specifically interested in global 
agreements at that time, interest grew with the number of ITF CBAs, and in 
7. IMEC is closely associated with the ISF. Both organizations share staff and office space. 
IMEC, however, is structured differently, in that companies join IMEC directly. It is also 
focused on collective bargaining, while the ISF has a political mandate.
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2001 the ITF and IMEC negotiated their first industry level pay  agreement 
for seafarers on FOC ships. These negotiations set the pattern for pay and 
working conditions for a significant and growing portion of the global
workforce. Since the original agreement, the Japanese Shipowners’ 
Association and the Danish Shipowners’ Association have joined IMEC
at the table (Lloyd’s List, 2 August 2004), forming the Joint Negotiating 
Group (JNG). The JNG negotiates with the steering committee of the 
ITF Fair Practices Committee in what is now known as the International 
Bargaining Forum (IBF). JNG members directly control about 2200 ships. 
Including JNG members, ITF contracts are in effect on about 6000 FOC 
vessels, out of about 20,000 total registered FOCs worldwide. IBF negotia-
tion outcomes also indirectly influence wage rates on ships not under ITF 
contrat (Lloyd’s List, 19 Sept. 2003).
As with the employers, the ITF has its internal disagreements, although 
so far these have been resolved between the unions involved. In particular, 
there is the divide between unions from industrialized countries seeking to 
raise wages in the FOC market to preserve jobs at home, and labour  supplier 
country unions, some of whom seek to undermine the global wage standard 
to gain jobs for their members. This has meant balancing the economic 
imperatives of maintaining bargaining leverage in a deregulated global 
labour market with the political imperatives of satisfying affiliate interests. 
Strategically, the ITF does this by segmenting maritime labour markets 
through targeted industrial action, classifying certain categories of vessels 
as FOC, subject to international pay rates, and certain categories of vessel 
as “national flag,” where national pay scales—either higher or lower—apply 
(Lillie, 2004). Central policy implementation by the inspector network has 
been critical for consistency in implementing labour market segmentation, 
because the ITF must be sure that the same categories of vessels are labelled 
FOC everywhere, and those vessels with ITF agreements are not boycotted 
by national unions applying inconsistent standards.
PORT UNIONS IN THE FOC CAMPAIGN
Port unions have found FOC campaign structures useful in their own 
struggle against deregulation and de-unionization. Unlike seafaring unions, 
dock unions did not decide to create an inspector network and empower the 
ITF to more effectively defend against deregulation. Rather, because of their 
participation, the inspector network and the growing influence of the ITF 
in the industry have redefined their possibilities for transnational action. 
Specifically, the FOC campaign provides dock unions with (1) resources 
for combating the worldwide push by shipping companies to introduce 
self-handling, (2) opportunities for direct solidarity assistance during strikes 
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and contract negotiations. Although, in principle, dock unions could create 
transnational networks and global capabilities independently of the FOC 
campaign (and some have), there is no point (except for those unions seeking 
to act outside the ITF for one reason or another), because the FOC campaign 
provides a functional global network for them to access. 
In comparison with shipboard industrial relations, in ports the impact 
of globalization is varied. There is a locally and temporally specific aspect 
to port union industrial strength which allows them to exert significant 
leverage through purely localized action, if the appropriate repertoires of 
contention are in place (Turnbull, Morris and Sapsford, 1996). Competition 
between union locals exists, and is significant under some circumstances 
(Bertzbach and Mujkanociv, 1997), but in many cases transnational union 
relations are not affected by it—in particular when industrial factors do not 
place unions in competition, but instead provide opportunities for comple-
mentary solidarity (Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004).
With exceptions such as the UK and New Zealand, where port reform 
started in the 1980s, most efforts at deregulation and de-unionization of 
ports started in the 1990s. According to the Dockers’ Section Report on 
Activities, despite continuing technologically motivated reductions in dock 
employment through the 1980s, “the industry has escaped the current trend 
towards privatization which affects many of the ITF’s industrial  sections” 
(ITF ROA, 1986: 75). However, at the 1990 ITF Congress, the ITF Dockers’ 
Section noted “a number of massive attacks by port employers on  dockers’ 
established working conditions and employment security systems” (ITF 
CP, 1990: 67). By 1994, it was clear that a systematic, global process 
was at work, including outright attacks on union rights in many places, 
 unfavourable deregulation, and potentially problematic (from the unions’ 
perspective) privatizations (ITF CP, 1994: 69). 
In the late 1980s, with proposals for port liberalization being floated 
in many countries, dock unions sensed the threat, and began the lengthy 
processes of building stronger linkages with the seafarers and with each 
other. In 1986, the Dockers’ Section voted to hold its annual meeting in con-
junction with the FPC to facilitate communication of solidarity requests. In 
1987, at the request of the dockers, the FPC passed a resolution stating that 
seafarers should not cooperate when non-union labour was used to handle 
their ships, and that seafarer affiliates should assist dockers in the event 
of a labour dispute. In 1989, again on request from the dockers, the FPC 
passed a policy statement restricting the use of self-unloading  vessels so 
that seafarers would not “carry out cargo handling work normally performed 
by dock workers” (ITF CP, 1990: 68). Although the Dockers’ Section and 
FPC passed resolutions, they were not broadly implemented by seafaring 
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affiliates,9 and the inspectorate was not sufficiently developed at that point 
to implement them independently.
CARGO HANDLING BY SEAFARERS
Generally, the work of seafarers relates to the navigation and main-
tenance of ships, while  dock workers are charged with their loading and 
unloading. There is, however a ‘grey area’ of tasks involved in the loading 
and unloading of ships that might be charged either to seafarers or dockers. 
This grey area is partly defined functionally, but since it is also a matter 
of union jurisdiction, safety regulation, and immigration policy, the issue 
has become politicized. Employers seek as much flexibility as possible in 
who might perform a given task, ideally defining a wide number of tasks as 
potentially performed by labour employed under FOC conditions. Unions, in 
general, have sought to preserve their jurisdictions by preventing seafarers 
from performing work traditionally assigned to dockers. During the 1990s, 
cargo handling by seafarers became a major dock union issue, as some 
shipowners began systematically to use seafarers for this work. Although 
large-scale replacement of dockers is probably not practical, substitution 
can occur at strategic moments, such as during strikes. 
The ITF role in self-loading has been defined by the natural links to 
FOC campaign issues. At the 1994 Congress, the Dockers’ Section reported 
that, based on an ITF survey, incidents of seafarers performing work tradi-
tionally assigned to dockers had increased significantly. Because this was 
more a problem of FOCs than anything else, the FPC approved a clause for 
inclusion in all ITF CBAs on FOC ships stating that seafarers should not 
be penalized for refusing to perform dock work (ITF CP, 1994: 73). On the 
global and regional political level, the ITF seeks to engender a consensus 
against self-loading in international law, because international law shapes 
and influences the legitimacy of national laws on cargo handling. One 
example has been the fight over the EU Ports Directive on Market Access, 
which, among other things, would have permitted self-handling in EU ports. 
The Directive was defeated in an historical battle in the European Parliament 
after heavy union lobbying against it (Lloyd’s List, 20 Nov. 2003). It has 
now been resurrected by the European Commission, although no doubt it 
will become contentious again if no compromise is found on crucial cargo 
handling language. National and international legislation can support or 
9. At the 1998 Congress, the Dockers’ Section praised Germany and Chile for introducing 
cargo-handling clauses into their collective agreements, and urged other countries to follow 
this example (ITF CP, 1998: 59), indicating that application had not been widespread.
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undermine union jurisdictional definitions and safety rules on self-handling 
in collective agreements with port employers and shipping lines. 
Actual implementation of self-handling restrictions is conducted in large 
part through the ITF inspectorate, because it relies on educating rank and 
file dock workers to monitor port operators and shipping lines to ensure that 
port union jurisdiction is not violated, and to take steps to stop self-loading 
when needed. Consistent violation of the ITF position on cargo-handling by 
certain companies becomes a matter of concern for the ITF Secretariat. The 
Secretariat pressures these firms at the global level to change their policies, 
and coordinates global action against them if they do not (Lloyd’s List, 21 
July 2000; 15 Aug. 2000). 
DIRECT SECRETARIAT INVOLVEMENT IN STRIKES AND 
CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
Dock unions have sometimes leveraged ITF resources during diffi-
cult contract negotiations and for support during industrial disputes. This 
 section of the article will focus on two examples: the 1998 Australian dock 
 workers’ lockout, and the 2002 ILWU contract negotiations and lockout 
on the US Pacific coast. 
In 1998, the Australian Howard government attempted to break the 
Maritime Union of Australia (MUA). The ITF helped define the terms of 
the conflict by ensuring that it was Patrick Stevedores, an Australian firm, 
and not the much more powerful P&O Ports which secretly partnered with 
the Howard government in a conspiracy to break the union. P&O Ports 
also had an interest in breaking the MUA, and deeper pockets to take the 
inevitable losses from a strike. However, P&O Ports had its parent company, 
P&O Nedlloyd, to consider. P&O Nedlloyd, with its global fleet of ships, 
was extremely vulnerable to ITF boycotts, and, as a consequence, eager to 
avoid a confrontation (Trinca and Davis, 2000: 35). After a long struggle, 
which took on national importance, the MUA forced the Howard govern-
ment and Patrick to come to terms, although they made some concessions 
in their renegotiated contracts (Containerisation International, June 2000: 
68–69).
In a similar conflict, in the United States in 2002, the International 
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) came under attack from the US 
West Coast port employers’ association, the Pacific Maritime Association 
(PMA). During contract negotiations, the ILWU leadership suspected 
the PMA intended to incite the ILWU into industrial action, in order to 
provide a cover for government intervention in favour of the employers. 
In an unusual step, ITF general secretary David Cockroft sat in on part of 
105UNION NETWORKS AND GLOBAL UNIONISM IN MARITIME SHIPPING
the negotiations, to demonstrate ITF backing for the ILWU. ITF affiliates 
pressured representatives of PMA shipping lines in their own countries 
(Lloyd’s List, 19 Sept. 2002; 7 Oct. 2002). After the failure of some bizarre 
political and legal manoeuvring, and several months of negotiation, the 
PMA signed a contract which kept the coast-wide bargaining system intact 
(Logistics Management, 1 Nov. 2002; 1 Jan. 2003). How much leverage 
the ILWU gained from support by ITF affiliates is not clear, although it 
was probably a factor in closing out extreme options to break the ILWU, 
such as militarizing the docks.10
CONCLUSION
Over the years, the FOC campaign structure has changed from one 
driven by self-directed national unions forming a global coalition around 
loosely agreed political goals, to one of a tightly organized autonomous 
transnational network. The bellwether for its development has been the 
ITF inspector network, through which the ITF ties local unions and rank 
and file dock workers into global strategies designed around the industrial 
logic of bargaining in the maritime sector. Global unionism in maritime 
functions differently from national unionism, in that it is organized on a 
looser, network basis, and reflects the need for rapid, consistent action under 
a wide variety of circumstances. By exploiting interdependencies inherent 
in the production process through the ship inspector network, unions have 
regained a measure of control. The development of these capacities has not 
been automatic, rather it has required the restructuring of seafaring unionism 
on the global level, and the strategic reframing of seafaring and dock union 
interests in such a way as to promote solidarity between workers in different 
parts of the transportation chain. Globalization of maritime labour markets 
and threats to port union integrity have enhanced the ability of the ITF to 
obtain the consensus of its affiliates around a transnational agenda because 
the Secretariat has constructed the campaign infrastructure in such a way 
that seafaring and dock unions depend on FOC campaign resources, and 
therefore lend it their support. This construction flows naturally from the 
logic of the production process, which ensures that transnational structures 
are needed to exert pressure on employers pursuing global strategies. 
Seen as simply a strategic element of a capital’s use of worker  alienation 
to reduce worker control and extract surplus value, globalization in its 
varying manifestations is no different than any other social and technical 
restructuring of production. De-regulation through FOCs is not fundamen-
tally different from deregulation through union busting within countries, or 
10. For more details on this case, see Lillie and Martinez Lucio (2004).
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from capital mobility, if these are used as strategies to create spaces free of 
social regulation. New spaces of contestation exist even within the very fluid 
production processes globalization creates. However, as the FOC campaign 
demonstrates, radically new forms of worker organization may be needed 
to take advantage of these. For unions, this is both an imaginative and 
technical challenge, in understanding what the appropriate new structures 
are, and an ideological and organizational one, in redefining who is worthy 
of solidarity and under what circumstances. The maritime industry, while 
not providing a specific roadmap on how to globalize unions, demonstrates 
the importance of conforming union structure to the logic of production 
within an industry.
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RÉSUMÉ
Réseaux syndicaux et syndicalisme international dans le trans-
port maritime
Le transport maritime demeure sans contredit le secteur industriel 
le plus mondialisé de tous les secteurs et c’est également celui où l’on 
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retrouve une coordination au plan de la stratégie syndicale transnationale 
la plus importante. Sous l’égide de la campagne contre les pavillons de 
complaisance de la Fédération internationale des ouvriers du transport, les 
syndicats maritimes ont élaboré des structures mondiales transnationales qui 
bénéficient des interdépendances des chaînes de production et de  transport, 
en fournissant un levier à la puissance syndicale dans une portion de la 
chaîne, celle des ports, afin de promouvoir les intérêts des travailleurs dans 
une autre section de la chaîne, celle des bateaux en mer. Les marins sur les 
bateaux et les débardeurs dans les ports travaillent dans un réseau de liens 
interdépendants au sein d’un même processus de  production. La Fédération 
internationale des ouvriers du transport, une fédération internationale 
composée de syndicats de travailleurs du transport, basée à Londres, réunit 
les batailles des marins et des débardeurs sous une stratégie mondiale de 
« réseautage » syndical et d’action industrielle coordonnée. Les syndicats 
de marins s’appuient sur le levier industriel des travailleurs dans les ports 
en vue de négocier des ententes sur une rémunération minimale standard, 
alors que les débardeurs se servent du levier de l’influence  croissante de 
la Fédération internationale dans leurs efforts pour contrecarrer le déloge-
ment des syndicats dans les ports. La présence de la Fédération interna-
tionale sur le terrain est assurée par la réserve de pouvoir de la campagne 
 contre l’utilisation des pavillons de complaisance, c’est-à-dire par le 
réseau d’inspection des navires de la Fédération internationale. Ce réseau 
fournit la base du pouvoir en vue d’imposer des ententes collectives aux 
propriétaires de bateaux. Quoique conçue au départ comme une  ressource 
dans la  campagne contre les pavillons de complaisance, la section de 
l’inspection, soit directement, soit indirectement par le biais de l’influence 
de la Fédération internationale auprès des propriétaires de bateaux, confère 
en plus un levier aux syndicats dans les ports. Cet exemple met en évidence 
le potentiel, pour une stratégie syndicale, d’identifier et d’exploiter les 
interdépendances et les liens inhérents à des processus de production trans-
nationaux, en édifiant des institutions et des réseaux transnationaux adaptés 
à la logique particulière de la production dans un secteur industriel. 
La manière particulière adoptée par l’industrie du transport maritime 
pour se restructurer en empruntant des orientations internationales, en 
 dirigeant en partie la mondialisation de la production dans d’autres secteurs 
tout en étant également poussée par cette dernière, a créé un impact sur les 
possibilités de résistance chez les travailleurs des ports et les marins. La 
Fédération internationale et les syndicats de marins ont mis au point des 
stratégies pour bénéficier de ces possibilités. Ces stratégies syndicales se 
sont développées en interaction avec les contre-stratégies des propriétaires 
du capital. À différents niveaux, on voit que le capital maritime cherche à 
déstabiliser, à circonvenir et à défier ouvertement le contrôle qu’exercent 
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les travailleurs du transport sur leurs processus de production; ils  cherchent 
aussi à limiter leur capacité d’agir de façon solidaire avec d’autres tra-
vailleurs. Les stratégies des propriétaires des capitaux en vue de contenir 
l’aliénation des travailleurs maritimes se manifestent différemment sur les 
bateaux et dans les ports, à cause des différences que l’on constate chez 
les propriétaires au plan des occasions qui se présentent de reconfigurer les 
caractéristiques de la régulation des espaces dans les processus de produc-
tion. Sur les bateaux, la mondialisation des réservoirs de main-d’œuvre et 
l’absence de lien (par le biais de l’utilisation de pavillons de complaisance) 
entre les activités d’expédition et les espaces légaux, dont les syndicats 
ont régularisé l’accès institutionnel, ont façonné la structure des nouveaux 
réseaux de syndicats transnationaux aptes à représenter les marins. D’un 
autre côté, dans les ports, les propriétaires ne peuvent  échapper à la législa-
tion nationale du travail, aux syndicats et aux communautés riveraines. Les 
propriétaires qui ont une base dans les ports sont obligés de se battre pour les 
espaces où les travailleurs sont capables d’opposer une résistance efficace. 
Quoiqu’elle demeure solidement fondée sur une force nationale et locale, 
la stratégie internationale d’un syndicat dans un port demeure néanmoins 
fortement liée à la campagne contre les pavillons de  complaisance, à cause 
des liens étroits entre les marins au sein des processus de production et à 
cause des menaces communes et croissantes de la part de leurs employeurs 
communs.
La capacité de la Fédération internationale des ouvriers du transport 
de mener une action transnationale repose sur son réseau d’inspecteurs de 
bateaux, répartis dans les ports du monde entier, qui ont obtenu des accords 
collectifs et qui sont capables de les faire appliquer. Les inspecteurs de 
la Fédération voient à ce que les contrats soient respectés, coordonnent 
l’action du secteur sur les bateaux sans contrat et ils aident les marins en 
difficulté. Le réseau d’inspecteurs occupe une position critique eu égard 
au fonctionnement de la campagne contre les pavillons de complaisance, 
en fournissant une infrastructure qui permet à la Fédération internatio-
nale d’apparier la stratégie mondiale aux tactiques au niveau local. Les 
politiques et les méthodes de la Fédération peuvent être décidées collecti-
vement à Londres et mises en application par le Secrétariat à travers ses 
propres canaux sans réviser les désaccords entre les affiliés chaque fois 
qu’une action est envisagée au plan transnational. Le résultat des pressions 
exercées par les inspecteurs de la Fédération fait en sorte que cette dernière 
compte environ 6 000 bateaux sous un contrat de travail. La négociation 
collective entre la Fédération mondiale des employeurs et la Fédération 
internationale des travailleurs du secteur maritime et ses affiliés établit 
le salaire standard de l’industrie pour le secteur maritime. Les syndicats
de débardeurs se servent de la force de la campagne contre les pavillons 
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de complaisance comme levier dans le but de promouvoir de temps à autre 
leurs propres objectifs.
Le syndicalisme international dans le secteur maritime fonctionne de 
manière différente des syndicats nationaux en ce sens qu’il est organisé sur 
la base d’un réseau, mais de façon plus flexible : il reflète donc le besoin 
pour une action rapide et cohérente sous une immense variété de circon-
stances. La base de cette nouvelle structure demeure le réseau d’inspecteurs 
de la Fédération internationale, par lequel cette dernière rallie les unions 
locales et les débardeurs de la base aux stratégies mondiales entourant la 
logique de la négociation sur une base industrielle. Ce faisant, la Fédération 
exploite les nouveaux espaces de contestation qu’on retrouve au sein 
même des processus fluides de production que crée la mondialisation. 
Ce cas  montre que des formes radicalement nouvelles d’organisation des 
travailleurs peuvent être nécessaires pour tirer un avantage de la nouvelle 
vulnérabilité des propriétaires. Ceci se présente pour les syndicats comme 
un défi de nature à la fois technique et créative, dans une compréhension de 
ce que sont les nouvelles structures. C’est aussi un défi sur le plan organisa-
tionnel et idéologique en cherchant à redéfinir qui mérite de la solidarité et 
dans quelles circonstances. L’industrie maritime, tout en ne fournissant pas 
une feuille de route particulière conduisant au syndicalisme international, 
met en évidence l’importance d’une conformité de la structure syndicale à 
la logique de la production dans un secteur industriel. 
